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A reliable knowledge of ship’s position and movement in relation to other traffic participants and 
obstacles is a fundamental requirement for navigation and to avoid collisions and groundings. 
Consequently, the resilient onboard provision of position, navigation, and time data (PNT) is emphasized 
by the IMO e-navigation strategy, solution S3 “Improved reliability, resilience and integrity of bridge 
equipment and navigation information” and assigned risk control option RCO5 “Improved reliability and 
resilience of onboard PNT systems”.  
An initial step towards resilient PNT has been realized by the maritime community with the development 
of the Performance Standards for multi-system shipborne radionavigation receiver equipment (MRR). 
This MRR PS supports the full use of data coming from current and future radionavigation systems and 
services. Consequently, the combined use of several GNSS and the additional use of Space Based 
Augmentation Systems (SBAS) as well as optional terrestrial radionavigation systems (e.g. eLoran or R-
Mode) will be supported to increase the performance of positioning and timing.  
As a second step the development of Guidelines for onboard PNT (data processing) Unit has been 
identified as supplementary and necessary. Initial point is the on board use of GNSS receivers (Global 
Navigation Satellite System) and autarkic systems (e.g. radar, gyro, echosounder with bathymetric data) in 
combination for a comprehensive provision of required PNT data. Redundancy in available data enables 
the application of integrity monitoring functions to evaluate the current usability of safety-critical data and 
components. Aim of the guidelines is the specification of data processing rules towards resilient provision 
of standardized PNT data and integrity information. For this purpose a modular architecture of onboard 
PNT system is introduced and scaled to the need on data input as well as the performance of data output. 
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1. Background and Challenges 
Reliability, integrity and resilience are fundamental requirements on nautical onboard equipment 
identified as user needs in the frame of e-navigation and addressed as high-priority solution for safety-
critical systems. In this context integrity monitoring is a prerequisite to indicate the reliability of the PNT 
system as well as the provision of reliable data.  Furthermore the indication of integrity is used to support 
the connected applications regarding the usability of the provided data. Whether or not the onboard PNT 
system meets these fundamental requirements can only be evaluated with respect to the required quantity 
and quality of PNT output data. Due to their historical development most of the existing maritime PS (see 
Table 1) follows an equipment-related specification of minimum requirements on individual PNT data, 
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without consideration of integrity aspects. Furthermore at present neither the achieved, nor the target level 
of reliability, integrity and resilience is quantified by most sensors within today’s maritime PNT system.  
Table 1   Maritime performance standards of radionavigation receivers, autarkic onboard sensors and 
systems, and PNT related data processing 
 
 
A comprehensive specification of maritime requirements on PNT data provision and integrity monitoring 
is a complex task. Many factors should be taken into account: ship types and carriage requirements, 
diversity of nautical applications and tasks, changing complexity of situation, deviations from nominal 
conditions up to customized level of support. Therefore it is difficult to determine the true development 
needs on the maritime PNT system regarding architecture, components, and functions to ensure a demand-
driven provision of PNT data and associated integrity information. It should also be noted that during 
ship’s berth-to-berth navigation the requirements on data output of onboard PNT (data processing) Unit 
vary in time and space as a result of changing environmental conditions and nautical tasks. The challenge 
for the maritime community is to find an efficient way specifying current and evolving requirements on 
PNT data provision. The pre-specification of performance classes like explained in chapter 3 could be 
considered as appropriate basis for further discussion and consolidation.  
The aim of integrity information is the characterization of the current usability of components (e.g. sensors 
and services) and data (e.g. PNT data). A provision of unambiguous integrity information is essential to 
improve system awareness of the bridge teams and to enable the subsequent use of data for self-evaluating 
applications. An unambiguous meaning of usability statements can only be ensured, if applied 
performance key identifiers, such as rules for determination and thresholds for evaluation, are 
standardized for each set of PNT data and supported performance class. Only if the requirements from 
above are met the provision of standardized PNT output data and integrity information will be possible.  
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In principle, the technical feasibility of integrity monitoring depends on the available redundancy of data. 
A typical example in the GNSS context is the Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) whose 
applicability and capability is influenced by the number of available pseudorange measurements: More 
than 4 allow finding the occurrence of errors and more than 5 enable the identification of an erroneous 
pseudorange measurement. Without redundancy the integrity evaluation is limited to simple plausibility 
tests and enables the detection of gross errors, only. The analysis of consistency between different and 
independent data sources is a high-order integrity monitoring dealing with the confidence in single data 
sources based on a common reference model. Like seen in the PS of Integrated Navigation Systems 
[MSC.252(83)] this approach can only be  applied if a minimum redundancy is given in the PNT relevant 
sensor setup (see Figure 1). 
A more ambitious goal is the real-time estimation of PNT data accuracy and their indication. For this 
purpose the highest level of intra-system redundancy is necessary to enable that different partial errors are 
determined and evaluated regarding their influence on PNT data accuracy. A resulting challenge is the 
elaboration of dependencies between performance requirements on PNT data provision and resulting 
requirements on technical and functional architecture. For this purpose chapter 4 proposes a generalized 
functional model of an onboard PNT data processing Unit. Its modular structure supports the variety of 
current and potential future implementations as well as changes in environmental and operating 
conditions.  
In a minimum solution the used set of services and sensors directly provides all necessary PNT data. A 
combined consideration of sensor and service data is not realized. In such a solution each service and 
sensor is responsible for its own data quality and, if possible, the provision of integrity information.  
Multi-system or multi-sensor based approaches support the combined processing of sensor and service 
data enabling an improvement and/or evaluation of PNT data provision. Generally, the transformation of a 
certain set of input data into a certain set of output data can be modelled by an individual data processing 
channel. Each channel is based on a certain methodological realization of the main processing functions 
(evaluation and synchronisation of input data, the improvement of data and integrity information, as well 
as the evaluation and composition of output data) to meet a specific performance level for PNT data 
provision. The performance level will be achieved, if the nominal operating conditions for this processing 
channel are given.  
 
Figure 1   Overview of system, services and sensors intended for onboard PNT data processing 
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Generally, a modular system design is based on alternatively and complementary usable components, 
processing channels and functions. This modular approach is appropriate to elaborate how the onboard 
PNT data processing Unit responds to intended as well as unintended changes in data input.  
For example, the satellite-based radionavigation systems GPS, GLONASS (GLO), and BEIDOU (BDS) 
are recognized by the maritime community as means for world-wide positioning. Redundancy in received 
GNSS signals is exploited to realize a self-monitoring of positioning by application of RAIM. Therefore 
GPS based positioning with RAIM can be considered as an individual processing chain. With respect to 
same functionality and its technical independency from GPS, the GLONASS based positioning with 
RAIM represents an alternative usable processing channel. Satellite-based and terrestrial GNSS 
augmentation services provide correction data to support the application of differential positioning 
techniques (DGNSS). DGNSS service availability is often limited to certain coverage areas and can 
therefore only be used from time to time. Consequently, DGNSS positioning is more or less a 
complementary processing channel in comparison to GNSS based positioning.  
The GNSS related example illustrates the necessity to adjust the data processing to changing 
circumstances. Such an adjustment can only be based on the availability of data to determine the 
feasibility of individual functions and processing channels. Additionally it is possible to consider the 
quality of input data and intermediate results during adjustment processes. That enables to monitor effects 
of fault propagation and to evaluate their impact on the performance of PNT data provision.  
A great challenge in this context is the development of an appropriate intrasystem monitoring and control 
concept specifying how the onboard data processing should be dynamically adapted to changing 
operational and environmental conditions to ensure its functionality. Chapter 5 discusses briefly how the 
concept of parallel processing channels serves to harmonize the user needs and the technical 
implementation. 
At the end 2 representative integrations are shown to account for generality and neutrality of the PNT Unit 
concept. They are used to identify the next development steps. 
2. Approach  
The development of Guidelines for onboard PNT data processing has been identified as supplementary 
and necessary step towards resilient provision of PNT data and integrity information. Consequently, this 
working task is anchored as planned output in the high-level action plan of IMO’s Maritime Safety 
Committee and should be finalized until 2017 (MSC 95/22/Add.2). Aim of these guidelines is to define 
the major principles and functions of onboard data processing taking into account differences in 
requirements and pointing out dependencies on technical and functional system architecture.. Within this 
development process the need for sensors and services will be clarified as well as the standardization of 
the PNT output data and integrity information. An international working group (WG) has been established 
under coordination of the Maritime and Hydrographic Agency on behalf of the German Ministry of 
Transport to promote the development of guidelines. The following explanations inform about the current 
draft of Guidelines for onboard PNT data processing (Issue 1 of 31st July 2015) used by the WG as basis 
for further discussion and improvement. 
3. Requirements 
As mentioned above an essential prerequisite for further harmonisation and enhancement of the maritime 
PNT system is the comprehensive and unambiguous specification of requirements on PNT data provision.  
The overarching task of an onboard PNT (data processing) Unit is the reliable provision of PNT data 
including associated integrity information to bridge teams and ship-side application. Status information 
and contributions to alert management are more or less extracted from monitoring of PNT Unit’s data 
input, processing, and output. 
A safe execution of nautical tasks (e.g. perform of evasive manoeuvre, route planning) and applications 
(e.g. track control, collision avoidance) requires a certain set of PNT data with respect to  
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[1] amount and types; 
[2] accuracy; 
[3] evaluated integrity of certain data; and 
[4] continuity and availability. 
The variety of nautical tasks and changing environmental conditions (e.g. area, weather, traffic situation) 
are the main reasons that requirements on PNT data provision vary during ship’s berth-to-berth 
navigation. Therefore the design criteria of a certain PNT Unit are determined by accumulated 
requirements coming from nautical tasks and applications. Furthermore, differences in installed equipment 
and aimed level of support are additional reasons that PNT data will meet different performance level. 
Basically, a structured description of the diversity of requirements can only be achieved, if several 
performance level and classes for PNT data provision are introduced.  
Basically, a structured description of the diversity of requirements can only be achieved, when several 
performance levels and classes for PNT data provision are introduced. This approach avoids that a unit of 
maximum PNT performance has to be installed on all types of ships if a lower performance class of PNT 
Unit is fully sufficient for the navigational tasks. Furthermore, the quantification of requirements supports 
the harmonization between provision and application of PNT data, is open for evolving needs, and helps 
to clarify responsibilities in safety-relevant systems.   
First discussions result into the proposal to introduce various performance levels for a comprehensive 
registration of various requirements on amount, types, and quality of data. It may be sufficient to use 4 
performance levels for each individual requirement: low, medium, high, and premium.  
[1] An initial proposal to arrange the requirements on amount and types of onboard PNT data provision is 
shown in Figure 2 as beginning for further discussions. In relation to amount and types of primary PNT 
output data the low level supports the description of horizontal position and movement of an individual 
onboard reference point (see Figure 2). For this purpose it is sufficient to provide the following nautical 
information preferably for the Consistent Common Reference Point (CCRP): latitude, longitude, speed 
over ground (SOG), course over ground (COG), time and date. A medium level of PNT data provision 
could be associated to the description of attitude and movement of ship’s hull in the horizontal plane. This 
requires the additional provision of heading (HDG) and rate of turn (ROT) information. A high level could 
be achieved, if the primary PNT data are enriched with CCRP’s altitude and changes to enable that in 
combination with further information the under keel clearance can be evaluated. The premium version of 
PNT data provision could correspond with the complete description of ship’s attitude and changes of 
attitude by provision of yaw, roll and pitch angles and their rates.  
Requirements on each type of PNT data can also be described by 4 accuracy and 4 integrity levels. This 
approach enables that any accuracy level can be combined with any integrity level to reflect the diversity 
of requirements in relation to tasks and applications. If necessary in the future a finer categorization of 
requirements can be elaborated.  
 
Figure 2   Proposed performance level regarding amount and types of onboard PNT data provision 
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[2] IMO resolution A.915(22) introduced already 4 accuracy levels for positioning by specification of 
horizontal position errors (HPE) as follows: <100m, <10m, < 1m, and <0.1m. Similar approaches are 
feasible for other types of PNT data, e.g. for errors in heading as follows: <2°, <1°, <0.5°, and <0.1°. The 
scaling of accuracy requirements is a sufficient basis to coordinate offer and demand in relation to 
performance of PNT data provision. Generally, higher levels of accuracies can be met e.g. either by more 
powerful sensors (e.g. Inertial Measurement Unit in contrast to individual gyroscope), by augmentation 
services for error reduction (e.g. DGNSS based positioning in comparison to GNSS), or by application of 
smart data processing techniques exploiting redundancy in data input (e.g. error detection and exclusion 
methods). 
[3] The increasing safety awareness in the maritime community is the main cause for arising the need for 
integrity of safety relevant data and systems in the last decade. Therefore only recently Performance 
Standards of radionavigation receivers (e.g. GALILEO: [MSC.233(82)] or BEIDOU: [MSC.379(93)]) 
recommend the use of RAIM-techniques for integrity monitoring. As already mentioned, the purpose of 
integrity monitoring is the indication if safety-relevant systems, signals and data are currently usable. 
Reversely, if unusability is attested as a result of identified failures, malfunctions, or performance 
degradations, the affected systems, signals and data should be indicated and/or excluded from subsequent 
utilization. Resolution A.915(22) assumes an integrity loss of positioning, when the horizontal position 
error exceeds2.5 times its allowed value. Generally, it is impossible to determine the real value of a total 
error. Therefore the aimed evaluation of data integrity asks for appropriate methods for monitoring. 
However, it is fact that differences in integrity monitoring techniques and applied thresholds result in 
differences of monitoring results and should therefore be indicated. A logical consequence is the 
introduction of different integrity levels in relation to applied monitoring techniques e.g.: level 0 
corresponds with unsupported integrity monitoring; level 1 indicates the application of autarkic 
plausibility and consistency tests (e.g. consistency of range measurements); level 2 stands for 
multisensory-based plausibility and consistency tests (e.g. INS), and level 3 informs about the use of 
parametrized error models for accuracy estimations (e.g. premium PNT Unit).  
[4] For the specification of continuity and availability requirements it should be clarified, if these areto be 
considered in relation to individual PNT data types or certain data sets like introduced above. The joint 
consideration of PNT data sets, in relation to accuracy and integrity as well as continuity and availability 
is preferred. Therefore unavailability occurs or continuity is broken, if one component of the considered 
data set cannot be provided or does not meet the specified data quality. In practice, the continuity and 
availability of a data set is always less than the continuity and availability of included individual data. It 
can be expected that data with the highest vulnerability has the most impact on continuity and availability 
of a data set. It is ineffective, if only the continuity and availability of individual data is increased far 
beyond the level required for the data set.  
Typical probability values used for the specification of safety-relevant requirements are often related to 
Gaussian distribution curves and described by 2-sigma (~95%), 3-sigma (~99%), or more e.g. 99.8% and 
99.9%. If a 3-sigma availability is required per day, then unavailability should be below 14.5 minutes per 
day. Assuming that a typical ship’s manoeuvre takes 15 minutes or more makes verifiable that the 
availability of PNT data should be 99.8% or higher. The requirement on continuity expresses that a system 
should be able to perform its functionalities over a short time interval without interruptions and 
performance degradations. In case of the onboard PNT Unit the continuity requirement is met, when the 
needed PNT data (amount and types) are provided with regard to the required accuracy and integrity level. 
Maritime requirements on continuity are specified in amount of 99.97% for the provision of 
radionavigation services [A.1046(27)] as well as GNSS-based positioning [A.915(22)]. In the first case 
the continuity time interval (CTI) is specified with 3 hours, in the second case with 15 minutes. A 
reduction of CTI to one twelfth allows that the mean time between failures (MTBF) can be decreased from 
416 days to a less ambitious value of ~35 days. The introduction of several continuity and availability 
levels could force an application-orientated consolidation of both requirements. For example, if the 
continuity could be reduced to 99.5%, then a MTBF of 2 days is acceptable.  
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Following the above explained approach enables that requirements on PNT data provision can be 
described by 5 parameters (type and amount (T), accuracy (A), integrity (I), continuity (C), and 
availability (R)) and 4 parameter-specific performance levels (low (L), medium (M), high (H), premium 
(P)). Therefore a certain performance level of PNT data provision can be characterized by 
},,,,{},,,,{ )()( HHMMLRCIAT tPNTtPNT ⇒ . (1) 
More or less a reliable operation of the PNT Unit can be assumed, if during operational time Top the 
performance of provided PNT data meets almost always the requirements coming from currently 
performed tasks and applications.  
{ }PHMLRCIATandTtwithtPNTtPNT opRCIATachievedRCIATett ,,,,,,,)()( },,,,{},,,,{arg ∈∈≤ . (2) 
The reliability analysis of onboard PNT data provision is made more difficult due to consideration of both, 
temporal/spatial variability of operational/environmental conditions during PNT data provision and 
changing demand on supported performance level in dependence on active nautical tasks and applications.  
In the context of e-navigation the vulnerability of GNSS has been identified as justifiable reason to request 
a resilient provision of PNT data and integrity information. Generally, resilience can be considered as 
ability of a system to detect and compensate external and internal disturbances, malfunction and 
breakdowns in parts of the applied system. This should be achieved without loss of functionality and 
preferably without degradation of its performance. On the one hand resilience is a design criterion of any 
PNT system to ensure a certain immunity of data acquisition and processing against relevant failures and 
malfunctions to meet the requirements for accuracy, integrity, continuity, and availability under nominal 
conditions. On the other hand resilience addresses the demand on redundancy of input data and processing 
to offer the possibility that malfunctions and failures can be detected, mitigated and compensated to avoid 
any loss or degradation in functionality. Then resilience will be focussed on the further improvement of 
reliability in terms of accuracy, integrity, continuity, and/or availability. Ultimately, an improvement of 
resilience is associated with an aimed increase of reliability and can be considered as enhanced design 
criterion to achieve a higher performance of PNT data provision. 
An aim of an INS is to facilitate the combined use of data inputs coming from several and redundant data 
sources in order to enable that the integrity of safety-relevant equipment and data can be monitored. This 
is considered as prerequisite for the application of high-order assistance functions. If all PNT data are 
consistent within the common model of ship’s position and movement, integrity is assumed 
[MSC.252(839)].  The Performance Standards for Multi-system Radionavigation Receiver [MSC.401(95)] 
focuses on the combined use of any radionavigation system and service to exploit existing redundancy in 
radionavigation systems for the further improvement of PNT data provision by e.g.:  
 application of dual-frequency GNSS signal processing to reduce the influence of ionospheric 
propagation effects on GNSS ranging accuracy; 
 the combined use of several GNSS to be immune against individual system outages or to improve error 
detection and exclusion (RAIM) by increased availability of GNSS signals;  
 the additional use of terrestrial radionavigation system (e.g. eLoran, R-Mode) to protect positioning 
against broadband jammer operating in GNSS’s frequency bands; as well as 
 the future use of satellite-based augmentation services (SBAS) to improve the integrity monitoring of 
used GNSS and the availability of DGNSS correction. 
It becomes apparent from both examples that redundancy in data input and processing is an appropriate 
basis to increase the resilience of PNT data provision in terms of accuracy, integrity, continuity, and/or 
availability. For example, the additional provision of terrestrial radionavigation systems (e.g. eLoran, R-
Mode) is discussed as approach to ensure the continuity of positioning in case of serious faults of GNSS 
positioning e.g. induced by jamming. However, the real need on redundancy in PNT data input and 
processing can only be answered in relation to clear development goals derived from noted deviations 
between achieved and target level of performance for PNT data provision.  
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4. Modular Architecture  
As shown in Figure 3 the onboard PNT data processing can be realized by 3 main functional blocks 
covering the pre-processing of input data, the main processing, and the composition of output data. 
Tasks to be performed during pre-processing cover: 
 the evaluation, if the existing data input fulfils the demand on availability and quality to ensure a 
nominal operation condition for the onboard PNT Unit in relation to supported processing channels; 
 the temporal and spatial synchronisation of input data within ship’s Consistent Common Reference 
System; and 
 ultimately the evaluation, which of the supported processing channels of the PNT Unit can be 
performed. 
Especially for both evaluation tasks the self-determined PNT data of preceding epochs are needed. Aim of 
the evaluation processes is the identification of malfunctions and failures of used sensors and services to 
exclude erroneous and untrustworthy input data from subsequent data processing. However, losses and 
performance degradations of input data could result into partial or complete interruption of PNT data 
provision. It is quite understandable that with increasing redundancy of data input the chance grows to 
detect all substantial errors and to compensate their influence on PNT output data.  
The main processing block is composed of one or more processing channels. Generally, an individual 
processing channel is designed to meet a certain performance level of PNT data provision. For this 
purpose the processing channel transforms an expected set of input data into the aimed set of output data 
by application of appropriate methods with respect to the desired performance level. A specific processing 
channel can be applied for PNT data provision, if its demand on input data is fulfilled. For example, the 
performance level {L,L,M,-,-}1 of PNT data provision can be achieved by application of GNSS standard 
positioning methods (Least Square Error, Kalman Filter) in combination with RAIM. In this case the 
demand on data input covers the provision of a sufficient number of accurate ranging measurements 
extracted from e.g. signals of GPS Standard Positioning Service (SPS).  
In principle, it can be expected that a PNT Unit supports the application of several processing channels  
                                                     
1 performance level {L,L,M,-,-} of PNT data provision could mean: 
 amount/type – level L: latitude, longitude, SOG, COG, time and date,  
 accuracy – level L: HPE<100m; SOG<0.2knots; … 
 integrity – level M: provided by RAIM.  
 
 
Figure 3   Generalized model of onboard PNT data processing  
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 to meet different performance levels during berth-to-berth navigation in relation to navigation 
scenarios and nautical tasks in their temporal and spatial variation; 
 to support a seamless adaption of the data processing to changing availability of sensors, services, and 
data sources; and 
 to establish redundancy in data processing in order to achieve a higher continuity and/or availability of 
PNT data provision.   
Under consideration of all technological opportunities and taking into account the diversity of desired 
performance levels, the main processing block could be composed by M various processing channels. 
Furthermore it is expected that several technological opportunities support the same performance level e.g. 
{L,L,M,-,-} by GNSS positioning techniques using GPS or GLO or BDS signals. Therefore, for a certain 
PNT Unit it will be sufficient to apply a subset MVx of alternative and complementary usable processing 
channels (MVx<M) in relation to supported performance levels and aimed resilience of PNT data 
provision. Furthermore it should be specified how the results of individual processing channels should be 
used to generate the data output of the PNT Unit. In the simplest case rules for data selection are specified. 
If the main processing follows a redundant system layout, an additional refinement of PNT data and 
integrity statements is also possible. It is important that a certain version of PNT Unit is clearly specified 
regarding supported channels, used methods, and applied thresholds for decisions. This implicated on the 
one hand, that the demand on input data and therefore onboard equipment can be clearly determined. On 
the other hand a provision of standardized PNT output data and integrity information will be achieved to 
enhance user awareness regarding performance levels supported as well as currently achieved. 
The final functional block is dedicated to the composition of PNT output data streams in the supported 
data formats (e.g. as AIS or NMEA message). For this purpose the proposed PNT output data are analysed 
regarding availability and quality and merged with provided integrity information. Finally, the valid 
output data are used to generate output data streams in the supported format e.g. AIS, RTCM or NMEA 
messages. 
5. Channels, Functions, Methods, and Scalability  
In principle, an individual processing channel is composed of a sequence of functions performing the 3 
main tasks with a specific set of methods. The methods of an individual processing channel become 
feasible if their specific demand on input data has been fulfilled. The demand on input data of a certain 
version of PNT Unit will be derived from accumulated demands of supported processing channels.  
The methods applied by an individual processing channel determine what performance level of PNT data 
provision will be supported. Intended and unintended performance degradations in input data may impair 
the functionality of several or all processing channels of the PNT Unit. Consequently, a noticeable 
performance degradation of output data may occur. A usual change in data input may only result in a 
tolerable performance degradation of PNT output data e.g. lower accuracy of positioning outside DGNSS 
coverage areas. Otherwise increased and intended disturbances decrease the functionality in case of not 
redundant systems. The degree on resilience of a certain PNT Unit can be increased, if 2 or more 
processing channels are implemented using independent techniques to meet the same performance. The 
influence of unintended malfunctions and failures of sensors and services can be reduced or mitigated by 
e.g. additional positioning with eLoran in case of jammed GNSS. Therefore both, redundancy in data 
input as well as in data processing are a prerequisite to improve and indicate the reliability.   
The proposed concept follows the rules of a modular system design in relation to architecture, functions, 
methods, and data results. This helps on the one hand to elaborate all interdependencies between needed 
components, applied technologies, and supported performance of PNT data provision. On the other hand 
the PNT data provision can be scaled on carriage requirements, user needs, as well as nautical 
applications. Furthermore this concept serves the consequent and coordinated introduction of data and 
system integrity as smart mean to protect the PNT data provision against disturbances and intrusions as 
well as to achieve standardized PNT output data for system awareness of bridge teams.  
MTE/ISIS   Page 10 
 
6. Summary and Outlook 
As explained above the supported performance levels of PNT data provision determine the assignment 
and complexity of any onboard PNT Unit. Examples of integration are shown in Figure 4: PNT Unit as 
part of future Multi-system Radionavigation Receiver and as component of INS. Both realizations exploit 
the redundancy in data input to improve the PNT data provision and to monitor the data and system 
integrity. The example of MRR illustrates that the modular concept can be scaled to a certain set of input 
and output data. Both examples are based on the proposed modular architecture of onboard PNT data 
processing and supports the aimed scalability to the diversity of ships, nautical tasks, and navigation 
phases. 
A special challenge is the consequent implementation of data and system integrity into the PNT Unit and 
further the provision of standardized integrity information to establish system awareness regarding the 
currently achieved performance level. In this context appropriate performance key identifiers (PKI) play 
an important role for the effectiveness of integrity monitoring (indication of reliability) and management 
of data processing (resilient operation). A resulting demand on the further enhancement of maritime PNT 
systems (shore-side and ship-side) is the mandatory specification of methods for PKIs’ determination 
including thresholds for evaluation and rules for utilization. This is an essential prerequisite for the 
effectiveness of integrity monitoring (indication of reliability) and management (resilient operation) in the 
whole maritime PNT system and especially in the onboard PNT data processing Unit. Therefore the 
feasibility of integrity monitoring and the significance of integrity results should be elaborated per 
individual processing channel in relation to a specific performance level. By applying the above defined 
rules and methods it is possible to condition a certain PNT Unit in relation to supported performance level 
and aimed resilience in a scalable manner. This helps to identify the real demand on resources from 
redundant system layout up to requirements on infrastructures and services. 
References 
[A.915(22)] Resolution A.915(22): REVISED MARITIME POLICY AND REQUIREMENTS FOR A FUTURE GLOBAL NAVIGATION 
SATELLITE SYSTEM (GNSS). Adopted on 29 November 2001. 
[A.1046(27)] Resolution A.1046(27): WORLDWIDE RADIONAVIGATION SYSTEM.  Adopted on 30 November 2011. 
[MSC.233(82)] ADOPTION OF THE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR SHIPBORNE GALILEO RECEIVER EQUIPMENT. Adopted on 
5 December 2006. 
[MSC.252(83)] ADOPTION OF THE REVISED PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR INTEGRATED NAVIGATION SYSTEMS (INS). 
Adopted on 8 October 2007. 
[MSC.379(93)] PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR SHIPBORNE BEIDOU SATELLITE NAVIGATION SYSTEM (BDS) RECEIVER 
EQUIPMENT. Adopted on 19 May 2014. 
[MSC.401(95)] PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR MULTI-SYSTEM SHIPBORNE RADIONAVIGATION RECEIVERS. Adopted on July 
2015.  
    
Figure 4   PNT Unit as part of MRR (left) and INS (right) 
